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Abstract: The wine equalisation tax (WET), introduced by the A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation Tax) Act 1999 
(Cth), is, in essence, a wholesale sales tax on certain wine containing a specified content of potable alcohol that is 
sold for consumption in Australia. The apparent fiscal purpose of the Act is to reduce and recoup the public costs 
of alcohol abuse. The hallmarks of sound tax legislation are traditionally encapsulated in the tax policy principles of 
simplicity, equity, economic efficiency and fiscal adequacy. This article explores the extent to which these hallmarks 
are reflected in the rules of the Act. The authors conclude that the WET is not a “good tax” in light of any of the 
principles, and its deficiencies raise the threshold issue of whether alcohol taxation is an appropriate way to address 
the public costs of alcohol abuse. In the authors’ opinion, there is no valid argument for its retention.
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The WET: is it a good drop? 
Introduction
It is generally accepted in Australia that 
government revenue should be raised, to 
the greatest extent possible, by legislation 
that is readily understood by taxpayers and 
their advisers, that allocates tax liabilities 
fairly and without causing taxpayers to 
distort their commercial decisions, and 
that raises the intended amount of revenue 
at a reasonable cost to taxpayers and to 
government. These hallmarks of sound tax 
legislation are traditionally encapsulated 
in the tax policy principles of simplicity, 
equity, economic efficiency and fiscal 
adequacy. They were included in the terms 
of reference of the most recent review of 
Australia’s tax system.1
This article explores the extent to which 
these hallmarks are reflected in the rules of 
the A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation 
Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (WET Act) which 
commenced on 1 July 2000.2 The WET 
Act currently applies, on an ad valorem 
basis, to certain sales of potable alcohol 
defined as “wine” and that contains more 
than 1.15% by volume of ethyl alcohol, at 
a rate of 29%.3 Alcoholic beverages that 
contain more than 1.15% by volume of 
ethyl alcohol and that are not wine for the 
purposes of the WET Act are generally 
taxed under the rules for excise or customs 
duty.4 Excise duty is imposed by volume 
at a rate adjusted biannually by reference 
to changes in the consumer price index 
compiled by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. Customs duty on imported 
products is calculated by volume and 
value.5 In addition, all taxable supplies of 
potable alcohol in Australia are subject to 
the provisions of the A New Tax System 
(Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) 
(GSTA). GST is currently levied at the rate 
of 10% on the taxable value of the supply. 
This two-tier system of indirect taxation 
has the practical effect of elevating the 
consumer price of drinkable alcohol in 
Australia beyond what it would be under 
the GST alone. The apparent principal 
reason for the additional revenue take is to 
offset the direct and indirect public cost of 
alcohol abuse.
Salient features of the WET 
Act6
“Wine” is defined to mean any of the 
following: grape wine, a grape wine 
product, a fruit or vegetable wine, cider or 
perry, mead or sake, excluding beverages 
that contain 1.15% or less, by volume, of 
ethyl alcohol.7 “Beverage” is not specifically 
defined for the purposes of the Act and 
each of the six types of wine referred to 
in the general definition is defined subject 
to any further requirements set out in the 
regulations.8
Section 5-5(4) WET Act contains an 
assessable dealings table which lists a total 
of 24 assessable dealings in wine, 13 for 
Australian wine and 11 for imported wine. 
In summary, they are: wholesale sales in 
Australia of Australian wine or imported 
wine to a retailer; retail sales, such as cellar 
door sales, in Australia of Australian or 
imported wine by the manufacturer; and 
applications for one’s own use, such as 
tasting and other promotional activities.
The assessable dealings table also 
specifies the time of the particular dealing, 
the entity liable for the wine equalisation 
tax (WET) if the dealing is taxable and the 
normal taxable value of the dealing. Item 
AD10 of the table makes a local entry of 
imported wine an assessable dealing at 
the customs barrier. The 15 situations 
that give rise to a local entry are listed in 
the local entry table in s 5-30 WET Act 
together with the entity that is regarded as 
making the local entry for each situation. If 
an assessable dealing is a taxable dealing 
under the WET rules, WET is payable at 
29% of the dealing’s taxable value.
The taxable value for taxable wholesale 
sales is the selling price of the wine 
excluding WET and GST but including 
adjustments for royalty payments, the 
value of containers and non-arm’s length 
transactions. A “wholesale sale” is a sale 
to a purchaser who intends reselling the 
wine — all other sales are treated as retail 
sales.9 The taxable value for a taxable 
retail sale is the notional wholesale price 
adjusted for any additional costs such 
as those for marketing, packaging and 
royalty payments.10 Likewise, the taxable 
value of taxable applications for own use 
in the course of business is the notional 
wholesale selling price. In regard to 
wholesale sales, the intent of the WET Act 
is that the taxing point is the last wholesale 
sale. 
Where there is an assessable wholesale 
dealing in wine with the intention to 
resell wholesale, the intent of the Act is 
achieved in one of two ways. Either the 
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assessable dealing is not taxable because 
the purchaser has deferred the imposition 
of WET by validly quoting its Australian 
business number (ABN) to the seller or 
customs authority under the rules for a 
quotation11 or, if the dealing is taxed, the 
purchaser is entitled to a wine tax credit in 
the amount of the WET paid in calculating 
its net WET liability on its taxable wholesale 
sales of the wine. A credit does not arise to 
the extent that the prior WET amount has 
been passed on to the purchaser in the 
subsequent sale. Generally, the purchaser, 
like all retailers, is not entitled to a wine 
tax credit on any retail sales of the wine 
and, if the wine was obtained WET-free 
under a valid ABN quotation, the sale is an 
assessable dealing. An exception arises 
for taxed retail sales of wine that has 
previously borne WET, such as the retail 
sale of repackaged bulk wine mentioned 
above,9 where double taxation would occur 
without an offsetting wine tax credit for the 
WET previously paid. The wine tax credit 
table in s 17-5 WET Act lists 14 grounds 
that entitle a WET taxpayer to claim a wine 
tax credit.12 It also specifies the amount 
of the credit for each ground and the time 
when it arises. The taxable value for a local 
entry of imported wine that is a taxable 
dealing is the GST importation value.
Not all assessable dealings in wine 
are taxable. The WET Act operated 
prospectively from 1 July 2000 and so if the 
time of an assessable dealing, as stipulated 
in the assessable dealings table, is before 
1 July 2000, the dealing is not taxable. A 
post-1 July 2000 assessable dealing, other 
than an assessable customs dealing, is not 
taxable if the entity liable for the dealing 
is not registered, and is not required to be 
registered, under the GSTA.13 In the view 
of the Australian Tax Office, this does not 
render the wine exempt, but rather untaxed 
so that any further assessable dealing in 
the wine by an entity that is registered for 
GST would be taxable.14 An assessable 
dealing in wine that is a GST-free supply 
of the wine, or a non-taxable importation 
of the wine,15 is not a taxable dealing. 
Wine exports are GST-free,16 as are stores 
of wine for use, consumption or sale on 
an international sea or air journey.17 Wine 
exported as accompanied baggage in 
accordance with the relevant provisions 
and regulations by international sea or air 
passengers or crew is GST-free and so 
WET-free.18 Sales of alcoholic beverages, 
including wine, in sealed containers up to 
2,250 ml in an inwards duty free shop to 
persons arriving in Australia who have not 
yet passed through the customs barrier are 
GST-free and customs-free or, in the case 
of wine, WET-free.19 A customs dealing  
that is an importation of wine covered by 
Sch 4 of the Customs Tariff Act 1995 (Cth) 
is not taxable.20 A local entry of wine is not 
taxable if it was the subject of a taxable 
dealing while in bond21 or it is reimported 
unaltered wine and the importer is the 
manufacturer or an entity that previously 
acquired the wine in a taxable dealing.22
Since 1 October 2004, WET taxpayers who 
manufacture rebatable wine in Australia, 
directly, indirectly, individually or as a 
member of an associated producer group 
are entitled to a capped producer rebate 
in the form of a wine tax credit in the 
amount of 29% of the price (excluding 
WET and GST) for taxed or quoted for 
wholesale sales, and 29% of the notional 
wholesale selling price for retail sales and 
applications for own use.23 The maximum 
amount of the rebate for a producer or 
producer group is currently $500 000 
per financial year.24 The producer rebate 
is also available to a taxpayer, approved 
by the Commissioner as a New Zealand 
participant, who produces the rebatable 
wine in New Zealand25 and exports it to 
Australia and the taxpayer, or another 
entity, paid WET on the taxable dealing in 
the wine in the relevant financial year.26 An 
approved New Zealand participant may 
claim the rebate at 29% of the approved 
selling price.27
Evaluation and analysis of WET 
against the hallmarks of sound 
tax legislation
Policy behind WET
It is difficult to conceive of any meaningful 
evaluation of the WET Act in terms of its 
simplicity, equity, economic efficiency 
and fiscal adequacy without referring to 
its purpose or purported purpose. It is 
apparent from the above overview that 
WET is principally a wholesale sales tax 
on certain wine containing a specified 
content of potable alcohol that is sold 
for consumption in Australia. Taxpayers, 
endeavouring to determine the Act’s 
reach, are required to work through a 
series of complex definitions in order to 
establish whether they are dealing with 
wine for the purposes of the Act. The 
tax, when it applies, is calculated on the 
value of the wine, including costs such 
as packaging, at a rate apparently based 
on no consideration other than ensuring 
that consumer prices of wine did not fall 
when sales tax was abolished and the 
GST introduced in its place. As stated 
above, the apparent fiscal purpose of the 
Act is to reduce and recoup the public 
costs of alcohol abuse. The correlation 
between these costs as they relate to wine 
and the WET revenue is unclear. In any 
event, such a purpose does not sit easily 
with the fact that the Act is restricted to 
the delivery of drinkable alcohol through 
wine as defined, to the exclusion of other 
alcoholic beverages, and that it imposes 
a tax on wine different from that applied 
to other alcoholic beverages in a manner 
that compromises any underlying policy 
to address alcohol abuse. The link to the 
GST registration turnover threshold, the 
producer rebate (including the rebate for 
approved New Zealand participants), the 
exemptions and the fact that WET is levied 
by value and not volume, run counter to 
recouping costs and, more significantly, 
raising price barriers against alcohol 
abuse.28
The Henry Review29 considered Australia’s 
alcohol taxation30 and made the key point 
that:31 
“[T]axes on alcohol should be set to address 
the spillover costs imposed on the community of 
alcohol abuse, when this delivers a net gain to 
the community’s wellbeing and is more effective 
than alternative policies. Raising revenue is a 
by-product, not the goal, of taxing alcohol.”
It reported two recommendations in 
relation to alcohol taxation.32
Recommendation 71: 
“... all alcoholic beverages should be taxed on 
a volumetric basis, which, over time, should 
converge to a single rate, with a low-alcohol 
threshold introduced for all products. The rate of 
alcohol tax should be based on evidence of the net 
marginal spillover cost of alcohol.”
And recommendation 72: 
“... the introduction of a common alcohol tax 
should be accompanied by a review of the 
administration of alcohol tax, to ensure that alcohol 
taxpayers do not face redundant compliance 
obligations.”
This article is based on the assumption 
that the WET Act is a part of the 
Commonwealth’s policy and strategy  
to recoup the public costs of alcohol  
abuse and simultaneously reduce that 
abuse by reducing the consumption of 
price-sensitive would-be abusers.
Simplicity
The WET Act is clearly not absolutely 
simple — taxation legislation seldom is. 
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The principle of simplicity is, of necessity, 
relative to its associated principles of 
equity, economic efficiency and fiscal 
adequacy; to the fiscal and social goals 
of the legislation under scrutiny and to 
the complexity and predictability of the 
effected transactions and processes in the 
supply chain. The question is not whether 
the legislation is simple per se, but rather 
whether it is appropriate, technically 
and administratively, for its purpose.33 
The Act is confined to manufacturers 
of wine. When it comes to the abuse of 
potable alcohol, it is difficult to know on 
what rational basis one form of delivery 
is to be treated differently from another. 
The distinction between wine and other 
alcoholic beverages is made in the WET 
Act by a number of technical definitions 
commencing with a general definition of 
wine as any of: grape wine, a grape wine 
product, a fruit or vegetable wine, cider 
or perry, mead and sake, unless they 
contain 1.15% or less, by volume, of ethyl 
alcohol.34 Each of the beverages referred 
to in the general definition is then defined 
and made subject to any regulations.35 
Some rules in the WET Act in relation to 
taxable value apply specifically to grape 
wine to the exclusion of other wines.36 
These complex provisions confining the 
scope of the Act, the multiple taxing 
points, the exemptions and rebates and the 
associated system of wine tax credits are 
not justified by the assumed purpose of the 
Act. The assessment in this regard would 
be different if the purpose of the WET were 
taken to be a general revenue impost on 
the wine industry in a manner that did not 
inhibit start-ups and boutique manufacture, 
increased competition from New Zealand 
and provided a product range to suit all 
pockets. Clearly the Act fails the simplicity 
test when measured against the purpose 
assumed in this article and the volumetric 
alcohol tax recommended by the Henry 
Review.37
Equity
Inequity arises when tax legislation 
discriminates unfairly between taxpayers 
in the same material circumstances or 
produces economic or other outcomes that 
cannot be reconciled with the purpose of 
the legislation.
It has never been suggested that Australia’s 
taxation of potable alcohol is designed to 
eliminate its consumption.38 In the case 
of wine, the WET Act provides producer 
rebates and exemptions that stimulate 
production and encourage consumption. 
Ostensibly, it targets alcohol abuse and the 
associated costs to the public purse. This, 
in turn, raises the question of whether a tax 
on alcohol such as WET, be it by value or 
volume, can ever be fair to taxpayers who 
consume it responsibly. If an abuser-pays 
policy is impractical, the relevant costs 
should be met out of general revenue, 
rather than additional taxes collected 
indiscriminately from all consumers. The 
responsible consumption of wine, at 
present, is to be distinguished from the use 
of products such as tobacco, which, it is 
generally agreed, almost invariably comes 
at a public social cost. 
Consumption taxes such as WET are 
regressive. The WET on a bottle of wine 
as a percentage of the consumer’s income 
decreases as that income rises. This effect 
is compounded by the GST, a similarly 
regressive tax. The WET as a cost of 
business is included in the GST price taxed 
to the supplier who, in turn, sells to the 
consumer at a GST-inclusive price. As both 
the WET and GST are currently ad valorem, 
it is open to a lower-income consumer to 
mitigate this effect by purchasing cheaper 
wine, a fact that does nothing to diminish 
the vertical inequity of the WET.39 Two 
common measures of equity include 
horizontal equity and vertical equity. 
Horizontal equity holds that taxpayers 
who have the same income should pay the 
same amount in taxes while vertical equity 
requires people with higher incomes should 
pay more tax. If a volumetric tax were 
adopted as recommended by the Henry 
Review, the tax amount would be the same 
regardless of price.
Horizontal equity as between producers 
and consumers of potable alcohol is 
compromised by the fact that alcohol 
taxation in Australia is not uniform. The 
WET producer rebate is more generous 
than that for beer and there are no rebates 
for spirits. These differences are not 
justified given the avowed purpose of 
alcohol taxation. The sense of unfairness 
they engender is evident in comments 
such as the following in relation to the beer 
industry:40
“If the system [indirect taxation of potable alcohol] 
has one consistent feature, it is the historically 
favoured treatment of wine over beer, most evident 
today in the bizarre double standard that allows 
a small winery to receive a rebate of the first 
$500,000 of WET paid, whereas only $30,000 
excise is returned to a small brewery.”
The Distilled Spirits Industry Council of 
Australia has submitted, in a similar vein, 
that “there is simply no justification for 
government to subsidise one product 
(wine) whilst forcing other products to pay 
excessively”.41
Horizontal and vertical equity between 
producers and taxpayers alike is further 
compromised by the fact that Australian 
alcohol taxation at varying rates is applied 
by volume or value, or both, depending on 
the kind of beverage and the applicable 
legislation. For example, the amount of 
WET collected by value on taxable dealings 
in low-price cask wine is less than that 
for more expensive wine, even though 
the amount of ethyl alcohol delivered is 
the same or higher. These variations are 
indefensible in terms of avowed alcohol 
taxation policy.
Economic efficiency
As a general rule, good tax legislation does 
not hinder the development of the geese 
that lay the revenue eggs. In other words, 
taxes should not have a distortionary 
impact on business and the economy. The 
position may be different, however, in the 
case of legislation such as the WET, which 
raises revenue specifically to address a 
social problem in relation to a particular 
product. The producer rebate provisions 
in the WET Act, however, suggest that 
although a purpose of the WET is to erect 
a price barrier to wine abuse, it was not 
intended to reduce, or stifle growth in, 
the responsible consumption of wine at 
the expense of jobs and revenue. For 
this reason, this article, when addressing 
the criterion of economic efficiency, is 
predicated on the assumption that it is in 
Australia’s economic interest to develop a 
competitive and profitable potable alcohol 
industry that is socially and environmentally 
sustainable and that the WET should 
not impede that development. The 
shortcomings of the WET in this regard are 
foreshadowed by its inequities.
It is generally accepted that the social 
costs of alcohol abuse include:42 
“... additional motor vehicle accidents, additional 
outlays on health care and law enforcement, 
mistreatment of other family members, and some 
of the costs of reduced market participation and 
productivity.”
It is technically and administratively 
unrealistic to expect that the WET, or 
taxes on alcohol generally, be levied on 
an abuser-pays basis.43 The question is 
whether the WET, levied on all consumers 
by value, distorts the market behaviour of 
consumers and producers.44
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There is empirical evidence that higher 
prices curtail alcohol consumption, 
albeit more so for moderate than heavy 
drinkers.45 By the same token, if the tax 
is not levied at the same rate by volume 
across all alcohol products, as is currently 
the case in Australia, tax-related price 
hikes may not reduce consumption but 
simply drive consumers to the products 
least affected. This is especially so in the 
case of the ad valorem WET. Mention is 
made above, in relation to the inequities of 
the WET, that lower-income consumers of 
wine may mitigate its effect by resorting 
to cheaper brands as an alternative to 
abstinence.46 The same option is open to 
consumers of alcoholic beverages other 
than wine.47 This counterproductive  
WET-induced spike in the production 
of high-volume, low-cost wine is also 
potentially detrimental to the environment, 
particularly in relation to Australia’s scarce 
water resources,48 and the wine industry.49
Fiscal adequacy
Tax legislation is fiscally adequate when 
it raises the right amount of revenue 
for its purpose. In the case of the WET, 
this amount is the net marginal public 
expenditure related to the abuse of wine. 
Revenue from alcohol taxation is roughly 
0.2% of total federal tax revenue.50 In the 
absence of reliable evidence of the amount 
of public expenditure, at both the state and 
federal level, attributable to wine abuse, 
it is not possible to say whether the WET 
is fiscally adequate or not. In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that the Henry Review 
recommended that “[T]he rate of alcohol 
tax should be based on evidence of the net 
marginal spillover cost of alcohol”.51
Conclusion
The WET is clearly not a “good tax” in 
light of any of the hallmarks of sound 
tax legislation. Its deficiencies raise the 
threshold issue of whether alcohol taxation 
is an appropriate way to address the 
public cost of alcohol abuse. If the general 
economic benefits derived from the alcohol 
industry outweigh this disadvantage, it is 
difficult, as a matter of fairness, to justify  
a product-specific tax borne ultimately  
by responsible consumers. There is a 
case to be made that governments should 
combat alcohol abuse in other ways and 
that its cost is appropriately expensed to 
general revenue. This is especially so  
given the practical difficulties in quantifying 
the public cost of alcohol abuse and 
recouping it on an abuser-pays basis. 
The producer rebates in the WET Act 
exemplify the policy folly of encouraging 
the production of wine in tax legislation 
that has the purpose of discouraging its 
consumption.52
There is no denying, on the available 
evidence, that alcohol taxation does, to 
some degree,53 reduce its consumption 
and there is a body of opinion that it is 
the most effective method for addressing 
alcohol-related problems,46 albeit 
that cross subsidisation and retailer 
promotions54 may frustrate its efficacy in 
regard to consumption.55 If the prevailing 
opinion is that alcohol taxation be retained, 
then it should apply uniformly across the 
alcohol industry either by volume or value. 
The simplest way to achieve the latter is by 
a hike in the GST, as it applies to alcoholic 
beverages, at a rate based on reliable 
evidence of relevant state and federal 
expenditure.56 Alternatively, there is the 
volumetric alcohol tax as recommended in 
the report of the Henry Review.57 Whatever 
the way forward, it is submitted that there 
is no valid argument for the retention of the 
WET.
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